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THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

The Trans-Pacific Partnership:
The Economic Implications for Maine
by Catherine Reilly deLutio and Philip A. Trostel
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a free-trade agreement (FTA) between 12 Pacific-Rim countries. If passed, it
would be the largest FTA in which the United States participates. Catherine Reilly deLutio and Philip Trostel assess
the potential impact of the TPP’s tariff reductions and quota increases on Maine’s economy. The results suggest that
the TPP would likely generate slight increases in overall measures of Maine’s economy. The benefits would be relatively small and spread across the population.

T

he Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed
free-trade agreement (FTA) between 12 Pacific-Rim
countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the
United States, and Vietnam). If passed, it would be
one of the world’s largest FTAs. Debate on the TPP
has exposed starkly different views of how to secure
the position of the United States in the world economy.

Figure 1:

Historical US Tariffs

This article contextualizes the debate and brings it to the
state level by illuminating the TPP’s potential economic
impact on Maine.
The TPP covers numerous complex topics ranging
from typical trade issues such as import duties and
customs regulations to less obvious issues such as
government procurement, patent laws, and labor and
environmental standards. Moreover, the TPP’s unwritten
geopolitical implications may be as
complex and important as the agreements codified in its text.
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rade has been a central economic
and political issue in the United
States since the country’s founding.
Before 1789, each state had its own
tariffs that protected its favored
industries and often restricted
imports from neighboring states, an
unwieldly protectionist system that
hindered commerce. In 1789, the
states gave Congress the power to
remove barriers to interstate trade
and regulate international trade.
Like many governments of its
time, the early US government
imposed tariffs on select imports to
aid domestic producers and generate
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revenue. Over time, those tariffs fell as the country
embraced trade and entered into reciprocal trade agreements with other countries. As Figure 1 shows, the
average US tariff fell from 52 percent in 1899 to 16
percent in 1920 (USITC 2011). The Great Depression
disrupted that decline as Congress passed high tariffs to
protect struggling domestic producers. The average tariff
peaked at 59 percent in 1932. That strategy backfired
when other countries imposed retaliatory tariffs. World
trade declined sharply and deepened the Great
Depression (Madsen 2001).
In 1934, believing that economic recovery relied in
part on reviving international trade, Congress passed the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), which gave
the president the authority to negotiate reciprocal tariff
agreements with other countries. World War II gave
added urgency to the call for trade liberalization, as
many people believed the collapse of world trade had
contributed to global unrest. Countries sought to repair
their damaged economies and solidify peace through
multilateral cooperation.
In 1947, the United States, Canada, India, Australia,
and 19 other European, African, Middle Eastern, and
South American countries began a new era of international trade by signing the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), which created the framework of the
multilateral trading system that exists today. Over the
next few decades, the GATT’s membership grew and
trade barriers between GATT countries fell.
The GATT eventually led to formation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, which now
CONSUMER BENEFITS OF TRADE
Today’s average US home is a showcase of foods,
clothes, electronics, and household items made
in other countries. Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal
(2016) estimate that low-priced imports increase US
consumers’ purchasing power by 8 percent in aggregate. The savings are even greater (up to 69 percent)
for low-income consumers, who spend a higher
portion of their income on traded goods.
Aggregated across the entire economy, these gains
are dramatic. US consumers spent $6.8 trillion in
2014 (USBLS 2015). An 8 percent savings on that
sum is over $543 billion, nearly equivalent to the
entire economic output of Maine, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire that year.
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has 162 members representing 90 percent of the world’s
population. WTO members agree to treat products
imported from all other members equally. In other
words, a country cannot lower tariffs for one WTO
member without lowering them for all members. The
exception is when two members enter into a separately
negotiated reciprocal FTA. The WTO’s broad membership makes it challenging to reach consensus on some
topics. Many countries have turned to regional agreements such as the TPP to negotiate complex issues such
as intellectual property rights, copyright laws, international data flows, debit and credit cards, customs regulations, and environmental and labor practices.
Today, the United States has a relatively liberal trade
policy compared to earlier periods. About two-thirds of
US imports are duty free, and the average tariff on the
remaining one-third is just 4.4 percent. At that level,
exchange rates can have a stronger impact on import
prices than tariffs. However, select agricultural and manufactured goods such as sugar, dairy products, cotton,
sneakers, and automobile parts still have high tariffs.
TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY

G

lobalization refers to the growing integration of
economic activities across international borders.
Three components of globalization are particularly
relevant to trade: falling transportation costs, advances
in telecommunication, and growth in low-income
countries.
Transportation
Products now traverse the globe faster and more
reliably than before. The development of containers in
the 1970s revolutionized the shipping industry, greatly
reducing the time needed to load, unload, and transfer
goods between ships, trucks, and rail cars. The cost of air
transport has plummeted and opened entirely new
markets for fresh goods that would spoil on long sea
voyages. Air transport now accounts for roughly
one-quarter of US imports and exports by value.1
Telecommunication
Worldwide, over 3 billion people used the internet
in 2015, up from 400 million in 2000 (ITU 2015).
Internet access increases productivity by helping businesses communicate better with suppliers, find qualified
employees, learn about market developments, and use a
greater variety of cost-saving technologies and services.
17

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

Furthermore, the internet creates an unprecedented
opportunity to connect with new customers both
domestically and around the globe.
Advances in telecommunication, coupled with
advances in transportation, allow companies to segment
their operations and locate each business activity in the
most advantageous location. People, designs, and prototypes can move quickly from one location to another
without delaying the flow of business. Companies can
now lower their costs by locating low-skilled assembly
operations in low-wage countries.
Global Development
As low-income countries around the world grow
and industrialize, they become larger players in the
global economy. Asia’s share of global economic activity
doubled from 19 percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 2015.
Goods from China alone have increased from 3.1
percent of US imports in 1990 to 21.5 percent in 2015.
This growth has helped lift hundreds of millions of
people out of extreme poverty (Olinto et al. 2013).
However, trade theory predicts that increased imports
from low-wage countries will put downward pressure on
the value of low-skilled labor in the United States, which
has indeed happened.
Globalization is a powerful force that has permanently altered the scale on which people do business.
The economies of hundreds of countries are now
complexly intertwined; the consequences of events and
developments in each country now ripple farther and
faster than ever before.
THE IMPACT OF TRADE ON US WORKERS

D

uring the mid-twentieth century, US trade liberalization coincided with steadily rising employment.
Employment grew even as the share of US workers in
manufacturing declined from its peak of 37.9 percent
in 1943 to 8.7 percent in 2015 (US Bureau of Labor
Statistics). Average hourly earnings increased significantly from 1950 to the late 1970s, peaking at $23.56 in
1978 (measured in 2015 dollars). Since then, real wages
have stagnated. There is an active debate about the
source of wage stagnation. It appears to be the result of
several factors including trade, technological advances,
and the distribution of corporate profits. The degree
to which trade affects individual workers depends on
several variables.
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Import-Competing Versus Nonimport-Competing

Perhaps the simplest factor determining whether
trade affects workers is the degree to which their
industry competes with foreign imports. Foreign competition has hit US manufacturers particularly hard. US
service providers, in contrast, have been somewhat sheltered; a haircut, a hotel room, or an electrical repair
cannot be made in one country and used in another.
Trade has helped some service industries by reducing the
cost of inputs and increasing consumers’ purchasing
power. Technology is beginning to expand trade into
formerly nontraded services, for instance accounting,
graphic design, and medical transcription, and that
trend is likely to continue (Pisani and Ricart 2016).
Exporting Versus Nonexporting
Businesses that successfully tap into export markets
can hire more workers and often pay better wages. One
study of US workers found that a 1 percent increase in
exports by their industry led to a 1 percent increase in
wages even for individuals in low-skilled occupations
(Ebenstein et al. 2014). Export opportunities are not
reserved for large-scale operations. The Maine elver
fishery is a good example of an economic opportunity
that would not exist without international trade.
High-Skilled Versus Low-Skilled
In some cases, the skills and occupation of individual US workers can be a stronger determinant of how
trade affects their earnings than their industry (Ebenstein
et al. 2014). According to Ebenstein et al. (2014),
during the 1980s and 1990s, there was a decline of 6
million routine (low-skill) positions in manufacturing,
but an increase of 1 million nonroutine (high-skill)
positions. Increased trade with low-income countries
has put downward pressure on the value of low-skilled
labor in the United States while putting upward pressure on the value of high-skilled labor.
Regional Variations
Classical economic theory maintained that workers
adversely affected by trade would eventually transition
to other industries or relocate to areas with stronger
economies. Recent research has challenged this thinking.
Empirical evidence shows that areas with concentrations
of labor-intense manufacturing industries (which have
generally suffered the most from import competition)
have persistently higher unemployment, lower wages,
and lower labor market participation (Autor et al. 2013).
18
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Part of that may be lower relocation rates among
workers without a college degree; they are less likely to
move in search of new job opportunities (Taylor et al.
2008). Falling home prices in depressed areas also raise
the cost of moving. In these areas, growth in less affected
parts of the economy has not been able to absorb the
high number of displaced workers.
MAINE’S ECONOMY POST-NAFTA

A

ssessing the TPP’s potential impact on Maine
requires an understanding of how the state’s economy
has responded to the global forces described earlier, and
where it now stands. This article uses implementation of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in
1994 as a benchmark to examine these changes.
Measures of Overall Growth
By several key measures, Maine’s overall economy
has grown since 1994. On average, median household
income rose 0.86 percent per year adjusting for inflation,

Table 1:

Maine’s Top 10 Food Commodity
Exports in 2015

Commodity
Lobster, live

Value
(millions)

Average
annual
increase
2010–2015

-------- $ --------

-------- % -------

347.0

15

Salmon, fillets

46.2

59

Sea urchins and sea cucumbers

25.2

-3*

Salmon, whole

21.5

-5

Potatoes, prepared and frozen

18.9

-15

Blueberries and cranberries,
frozen

17.2

14

Blueberries and cranberries,
fresh

11.8

0

Lobster, prepared

11.6

45

Maple sugar and syrup

7.5

13

Chicken eggs

4.6

15

* There are no recorded exports in the sea urchin and sea
cucumber commodity category until 2012, so annual
increase is based on 2012–2015.
Source: US Census Bureau: Economic Indicators Division
USA Trade online.
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surpassing the national rate of 0.31 percent. In all,
Maine incomes rose from 94.0 percent of the US
median in 1994 to 96.3 percent in 2014. The broadest
measure of Maine’s economy, its gross domestic product
(GDP), also grew after 1994. Through 2014, real GDP
increased 29 percent. However, US real GDP grew 49
percent during that time. The difference seems to be
that Maine GDP stagnated after 2004, while US GDP
continued to grow.
Exports have been a bright spot for Maine, increasing
at over twice the annual rate of the rest of the economy
(3.1 percent compared to 1.3 percent). In 2015, Maine’s
top five export products were lobster (12.2 percent of
total exports), civilian aircraft and parts (8.7 percent),
electronic integrated circuits (8.3 percent), coniferous
wood (5.7 percent), and chemical wood pulp (4.9
percent). Top export destinations were Canada (46.5
percent), Malaysia (7.7 percent), China (7.6 percent),
Germany (3.8 percent), and Japan (3.0 percent).
Before 2007, growth of Maine exports often
exceeded US growth; since 2007, it has generally lagged.
Still, Maine food exports have increased significantly in
the last decade, more than doubling from $288 million
in 2007 to $588 million in 2015 (Table 1) (US Census
Bureau: Economic Indicators Division USA Trade
online). Exports of live lobster accounted for most of
that growth, with additional contributions from farmed
salmon, sea urchins, sea cucumbers, and elvers.
According to Tom Bell in the Portland Press Herald
(January 5, 2015), exports are a growth area for Maine
food producers.
Employment measures also show slowing growth in
recent years. Maine has gained almost 90,000 jobs since
NAFTA (17 percent growth), but gains have been stifled
by two national recessions, the continued decline of
manufacturing, and slow population growth. For most
of the 1990s, Maine’s job growth averaged 2 percent per
year, but it has averaged just 0.5 percent annually since
the Great Recession technically ended in 2009. Overall
job gains mask deep losses in some industries. From
1994 to 2015, the number of Maine workers employed
in manufacturing fell 40 percent, from 83,000 to
50,000. That decline was spread across many industries,
with concentrations in paper, leather products, transportation equipment, computer and electronic products,
and wood products.2
These job losses are part of a sectoral decline in
manufacturing that predates NAFTA by 50 years.
During World War II, manufacturing employed nearly
19
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half (48.8 percent) of all Maine workers and 37.9
percent of US workers. Those percentages gradually
merged over the next 60 years. While this transition has
not been painless, it does seem to be drawing to a close.
As the Brookings Institution (2006: 6) noted, “The
ongoing and still painful shift to a more diversified
service-oriented economy means that [Maine] has less
to lose in the future and more to gain.” As manufacturing employment has fallen, other sectors have grown.
Since 1990, Maine has gained nearly 70,000 jobs in
management, administrative services, and healthcare.
These trends reflect a shift from goods to services
that has occurred throughout the country. Technological
advances and increased trade have lowered the cost of
many goods and given consumers more income to
spend on services such as health care, education, and
entertainment. The net result is that between 1990 and
2015, the number of jobs created by Maine service
providers nearly equaled the entire goods-producing
sector in 1990. Roughly two-thirds of service jobs are in
business, health, and education professions. In 2015,
their average earnings were $48,240, just under the
average for goods-producing workers ($50,105). The
remaining one-third of service jobs, in retail sales,
leisure, and hospitality, averaged less than half that
amount, $23,249.
Regional Variations
Below the state-level gains, however, are stark
regional differences. The decline of manufacturing and
natural resource industries has hit some parts of Maine
hard. Some remote communities never recover from the
loss of a dominant employer. Furthermore, the aging of
the population and the lack of in-migration has led to
decline in many rural communities. From 1990 to 2015,
jobs in the Portland labor market area grew 30 percent,
Bangor and Lewiston grew 20 percent and 19 percent,
respectively, and the rest of Maine grew just 4 percent.
The Role of Trade
The role of international trade in these changes has
been debated for years. In 2003, the Maine Legislature
authorized, “The Effects of NAFTA on the Maine
Economy,” a report that assessed Maine’s economic
gains and losses in the first decade of NAFTA’s existence (Planning Decisions 2003). According to the
report, during that time, trade with Canada and
Mexico grew twice as quickly as the rest of Maine’s
economy, and the nature of trade diversified beyond its
MAINE POLICY REVIEW
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historic concentration in wood and paper products.
Canadian investment in Maine grew. Furthermore, access
to low-cost imports generated widespread consumer
savings. The report asserts that Maine both lost and
gained manufacturing jobs because of NAFTA, but the
overall effect was likely a net loss. However, the report
noted increases in broader economic measures including
real personal income, gross state product, exports, and
imports. It stopped short of saying whether NAFTA’s
overall impact on Maine was positive or negative.
Since 2003, those trends have continued.
Manufacturing employment has declined further, and
overall economic measures have risen slowly. Maine
consumers have continued to benefit from low-priced
imports, and the economic impact of those gains remains
impossible to quantify. There is no single economic indicator, or econometric calculation, that fully captures
trade’s impact on Maine, but various aspects of trade’s
effects are revealed by multiple indicators.
Trade-Induced Job Losses
Statistics from the federal Trade Adjustment
Assistance (TAA) program are the best available measure
of workers hurt by foreign competition. (Unfortunately,
there is no corresponding measure of workers helped by
foreign trade.) From 1996 to 2012, 81,487 Maine
workers were involved in mass layoffs, and 27 percent
qualified for TAA.3 The other 73 percent did not qualify,
meaning the US Department of Labor determined that
other forces such as technological advances, changing
consumer demand, or domestic competition caused to
their layoff (Burnett 2009). While trade has been a
contributing factor to layoffs in Maine, it has not been
the sole factor.
From 1996 to 2012, 55 percent of Maine workers
affected by mass layoffs were in manufacturing. Burnett
(2009: 11) observed, “those [manufacturing] firms most
likely to be vulnerable to international competition are
those using more workers and paying lower wages (and
thus probably not investing in productivity enhancing
capital equipment) relative to their peers.” On the flip
side, MDOL (2012: 1) noted, “manufacturers that have
survived and are thriving are those that invested heavily
in capital-intensive production systems that tend to
have much higher performance requirements than what
many of the former production workers possess in terms
of education and experience.” Indeed, from 1990 to
2010, Maine’s manufacturing workforce shrank, but
became more productive and better educated. The total
20
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Figure 2:

US and Maine Unemployment Rates and US Imports

imported from Canada have been
relatively
stable since 1994, aver18%
aging 2 percent; Mexican imports
16%
have grown from 0.7 percent to 1.6
14%
percent; and Chinese imports have
12%
grown from 0.5 percent to 2.69
percent.
State import data do not
10%
exist,
but
it is reasonable to assume
8%
that
national
trends reflect circum6%
stances at the state level.4
4%
The United States has no trade
2%
agreement with China other than
0%
the rules of the WTO. The United
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
States first granted China “most
favored nation” status in 1979 and
US
ME
US Imports (% of GDP)
renewed that designation every year
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Bureau of Economic Analysis
until 2000, when the United States
granted “permanent normal trade
value of manufactured goods produced stayed relatively
relations,” as part of China’s bid to join the WTO.
constant even as employment fell. In discussing Maine’s
Under these conditions, without a bilateral trade agreetextile and apparel industry, Burnett (2009: 5) noted,
ment, goods from China have increased from less than
“workers in the few innovative surviving firms have had
5.8 percent of total US imports in 1994 to 21.5 percent
substantial real wage gains.”
in 2015. The value of China’s abundant resource—
Foreign imports do not appear to have affected the
low-skilled workers—has risen and put downward presoverall unemployment rate in Maine and the nation.
sure on the economic value of low-skilled workers in the
US imports as percentage of GDP have roughly
United States and Maine.
doubled over the last 40 years, while the unemployment
rate has risen and fallen through multiple business
Summary
cycles (Figure 2).
Maine’s economy has changed in fundamental
ways since 1994. It has continued its decades-long
Foreign Investment
evolution from an economy based on manufacturing
Employment by foreign-majority-owned affiliates
and natural resources to one based on innovation and
in Maine increased 34 percent between 1993 and 2013,
services. While it is impossible to quantify trade’s
nearly double the growth rate of overall employment
myriad impacts on jobs, incomes, and consumer prices,
(18 percent) (Table 2). Planning Decisions (2003) noted
it is possible to observe that Maine’s economy has
increased Canadian investment following the passage of
NAFTA. Familiar majority-Canadian-owned companies
Table 2:
Changes in Employment in Maine,
include Circle K, TD Bank, and TransCanada. Belgium1993 to 2013
based Delhaize Group owns Hannaford Brothers,
Maine’s largest private employer with over 7,500
Change
employees. Foreign investment typically helps US
1993
2013
%
workers through increases in wages, research and develTotal private employment
opment, exports, and productivity.
424,000 501,200
18
NAFTA

20%

in Maine

Trade with China
It is impossible to discuss NAFTA’s impact on
Maine without understanding the unrelated yet simultaneous increase in Chinese imports that occurred after
NAFTA became law. As a percentage of US GDP, goods
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Employment by foreignmajority-owned companies

24,200

32,400

34

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States (FDIUS),
Table G-8.
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grown. However, growth has occurred unevenly across
WTO forum. The TPP is designed to be a living agreethe state, it has often lagged US growth, and it is
ment that could add countries over time.
slowing. Thousands of individuals have experienced
The United States has existing trade agreements
painful layoffs, and many communities have suffered
with six TPP members: Australia, Canada, Chile,
the irreversible loss of a dominant employer. Many
Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. Collectively, those counother individuals and communities have benefited from
tries plus the United States account for over 80 percent
new economic opportunities that did not exist in 1994.
of the total economic output of the TPP region. Given
If the Maine businesses most vulnerable to internathe large portion of the TPP region with which the
tional competition have closed, relocated, or learned
United States has already liberalized trade, most of the
how to compete, then losses generated by previous
agreement’s economic impact will be in liberalizing
changes in trade will not be repeated. Moreover, the
trade with the other five countries (Brunei, Japan,
gains from future trade growth could be greater if
Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam).
sectors of Maine’s economy that benefit from trade have
The TPP would eventually eliminate nearly all
grown. Maine exporters may gain better access to
tariffs on goods traded between member countries, but
foreign markets; Maine consumers may benefit from
the phase-out periods vary significantly. For example,
lower-cost imports; and Maine service providers may
Singapore would eliminate all tariffs on all goods as soon
gain if their customers have
Table 3:
TPP Member Countries
greater purchasing power.
Whether Maine gains net jobs
will depend on the ability of
Percentage
Percentage
of world
Per capita
its businesses to capitalize on
of world
population
income
Average
the new opportunities created
TPP member country
GDP 2014
2015
2014
tarif
by agreement such as the TPP
$
%
%
%
and the related increases in
Existing US free-trade agreement
consumer purchasing power.
Australia

1.87

0.32

61,980

2.7

Canada

2.29

0.49

50,231

4.2

Chile

0.33

0.24

14,528

6.0

Mexico

1.66

1.73

10,326

7.5

Peru

0.26

0.43

6,541

3.4

Singapore

0.39

0.08

56,284

0.2

22.34

4.38

54,629

3.5

Brunei

0.02

0.01

40,980

1.2

Japan

5.90

1.73

36,194

4.2

Malaysia

0.43

0.41

11,307

6.1

New Zealand

0.26

0.06

44,342

2.0

Vietnam

0.24

1.25

2,052

9.5

Total, all TPP members

36.0

11.1

TPP members with existing
US trade agreement

29.1

7.7

6.9

3.4

ABOUT THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

I

f the TPP passed, it would
be the largest FTA in which
the United States participates.5 The 12 countries in
the TPP accounted for 36
percent of world GDP in
2014, although most of that
(22 percent) was the United
States (Table 3).6 All TPP
countries are members of the
WTO, meaning they already
abide by an extensive set of
rules on anticompetitive practices and dispute resolution.
By negotiating the TPP, the
parties hope to secure even
more favorable terms for their
businesses and consumers
and to reach agreement on
complex issues outside the
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as the agreement takes effect, whereas the United States
would eliminate most tariffs within a decade, with
others remaining in place for up to 30 years.
For the United States, the TPP’s most significant new
market is Japan, a large, relatively high-income country
with protectionist tariffs in several areas. Japan is the
United States’ third largest export market in the TPP after
Canada and Mexico, importing $62.5 million worth of
US goods in 2015. As an article on Bloomberg’s website
(June 18, 2013) by Brian Winfield suggests, Japan has
begun to loosen its historically high tariffs on some products, motivated partly by its struggling domestic economy.
Japan signed an FTA with Australia in 2014 and is
currently negotiating an agreement with the European
Union. Some proponents of the TPP argue that without
the partnership, US companies will begin to lose market
share in Japan (US Department of Agriculture 2016).
Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out among the
TPP members without existing US FTAs. They have
sizable populations, fast-growing economies, and relatively low wages. From 2010 to 2015, the average
annual growth of US imports from Vietnam and
Malaysia was 21 percent and 6 percent, respectively.
Furthermore, these countries currently impose relatively
high tariffs on US imports, averaging 9.5 percent and
6.1 percent, respectively.
In addition to tariff reductions, the TPP covers
numerous complex topics including digital trade, financial services, intellectual property rights, government

procurement, patent laws, and labor and environmental
standards. Its chapter on investor-state dispute resolution is perhaps its most controversial. These elements are
important to consider when evaluating the agreement’s
overall value.
THE TPP’S ESTIMATED ECONOMIC IMPACT
Background
The US International Trade Commission (USITC)
and several independent groups have assessed the TPP’s
potential impact on the US economy. There are several
points to consider when interpreting the studies’ results.
First, these studies focus on the most quantifiable
aspect of the TPP—its effect of tariffs and quotas. They
do not attempt to estimate the impacts of less quantifiable elements such as environmental and labor regulations, regulatory coherence, or legal ramifications, nor
do they estimate the TPP’s geopolitical impact. The
TPP’s economic impact is just one of several important
points of consideration.
Second, the impact of an FTA is estimated by
generating two projections of future economic conditions, one with the FTA and one without it (often called
the “baseline” scenario). The differences in employment,
wages, and GDP, for example, are interpreted as the
FTA’s economic impact.
Third, the numbers generated by economic models
should be interpreted as indicators of the probable

THE TPP’S NOVEL COMPONENTS
access to government-controlled infrastructure and
resources such as bandwidth;

US FTAs have become more comprehensive over time,
and the TPP continues that trend. The following list
is drawn from various reports by the Congressional
Research Service. The TPP is the first US FTA to

• contain a stand-alone chapter on regulatory coherence, although without an enforcement mechanism;

• include enforcement mechanisms (i.e., trade
restrictions) for violating the labor standards of the
International Labour Organisation;

• include a specific length of exclusivity rights for
biologics (drugs made from living organisms, such
as vaccines);

• require criminal penalties for theft of trade secrets,
including theft by state-owned enterprises;

• mention agricultural biotechnology (GMOs),
although only to establish a working group and
share information on laws and regulations;

• address overfishing and specifically prohibit subsidies that harm overfished stocks;
• require open access for providers of electronic
payment card services (credit and debit cards);
• cover wireless telecommunications service
providers, ensuring regulatory transparency and
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• specify that a country’s failure to act in accordance
with an investor’s expectations is not enough to
constitute a breach of the agreement; and
• exempt antismoking measures from dispute settlement.

23
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magnitude and direction of future impacts, not precise
predictions. In fact, it is common not to publicize exact
annual estimates to avoid conveying a false sense of
precision.
Fourth, the assessments are attempts to isolate the
impact that one variable (the FTA) will have on the
future economy. In reality, innumerable other variables
(unanticipated changes in energy prices, geopolitics,
fiscal and monetary policies, consumer preferences.) will
also affect the economy.
Table 4 summarizes the major findings of four
assessments of the TPP’s potential economic impact:
two for the US economy, one for the world economy,
and one for a specific sector (agriculture). These studies
are methodologically sound and representative of other
TPP assessments in terms of methods, scope, and results.
Furthermore, three of the four were conducted after the
TPP’s full text became public and therefore contain
fewer speculative assumptions about the agreement than
earlier studies.
These studies generally find that the TPP would
have neutral or slightly positive effects on the US
economy as a whole and increase both imports from
and exports to the TPP countries without an existing
US FTA (Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and
Vietnam).
The USITC study, which is the basis for the Maine
estimates in this article, found that the TPP would have
a modest, positive impact on the US economy in 2032.
Compared to a baseline scenario, the TPP would increase
Table 4:

US GDP, exports, and imports by 0.15 percent, 1.0
percent, and 1.1 percent, respectively. The largest export
gains by percentage would be in agriculture and food
(2.6 percent), with smaller gains in manufacturing,
natural resources, and energy (0.9 percent), and services
(0.6 percent). Import growth of 1.1 percent would be
evenly spread across all sectors. Compared to the baseline,
the TPP would increase US jobs by 0.07 percent and real
wages by 0.19 percent in 2032, with gains spread relatively equally across skilled and unskilled labor.
There are at least two reasons the magnitude of
these results may appear small compared to the portion
the global economy encompassed by the TPP. First, the
estimated impact of any FTA often appears small relative to the large, observable impacts of globalization.
Even retrospective assessments of past FTAs find that
most have only a marginal impact on overall US
economic growth, primarily due to the sheer size of the
US economy (Tyler 2006). Second, one of the most
notable differences between the TPP and past FTAs
such as NAFTA is the degree to which US companies
are now accustomed to competing with international
imports. In 1993, just 38.8 percent of US imports were
duty free. In 2015, fully 68.6 percent were duty free.
Many of the businesses most vulnerable to foreign
imports have closed, relocated, or learned how to
compete. Many other businesses are learning how to use
the new opportunities created by trade, such as cheaper
imports, foreign customer markets, and consumers with
greater purchasing power. Having traveled down the

Economic Impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Institution (Authors)

Forecast
year
GDP % Exports/imports

USITC
(Signoret et al.)

2032

USDA
(Burfisher et al.)

2025

Peterson Institute for
International Economics
(Petri and Plummer)

2030

World Bank (Lakatos et al.)

2030

+0.15

0.0

+0.5

+0.6*

Exports: +1.0%
Imports: +1.1%

Impact on United States
Employment

Additional notes
Real wages: +0.19%

+0.07%

Ag exports: +5.4%
Ag imports: +2.0%
No change overall

NA

NA

Exports: +9.1%

No change
overall

Skilled real wages: +0.63%

Imports: NA

Additional job
“churn”: 0.1%

Annual cost of delay: –0.5% of GDP

NA

NA

Additional job “churn”: 0.1%

Unskilled real wages: +0.37%

Skilled real wages: +0.6%
Unskilled real wages: +0.4%

*Combined impact on NAFTA countries.
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road of globalization for several decades, further expansions of trade may now have a less powerful effect on the
US economy than earlier expansions.
Of the several rigorous studies of the TPP’s potential impact, the USITC is the best suited for generating
state-level impacts. It provides the most detail across all
industrial sectors and the best documentation of the
categories included in each industry. Furthermore, its
model is based on methodology that it widely respected
within the academic community.
THE TPP’S ESTIMATED ECONOMIC
IMPACT ON MAINE

T

his section presents estimates of the TPP’s economic
impact on Maine, extrapolated from the USITC
estimates of its likely impact on the United States.
The USITC assesses effects in three categories: economy-wide measures (income, gross domestic product,
employment, and capital stock), trade (imports and
exports), and industrial sectors (three broad sectors and
56 detailed sectors).
The USITC estimates describe the TPP’s expected
impact on the entire US economy. To translate that into
the likely impact on Maine, we first establish the relationship between recent economic activity in Maine relative
to the nation. We calculate the average percentage of US
economic activity that occurred in Maine during the last
three years. We then apply those ratios to the USITC
estimates for national economic impacts. For example,
from 2012 to 2014, Maine GDP was 0.32 percent of US
GDP. The USITC estimates that the TPP would increase
US GDP by $42.7 billion in 2032. If 0.32 percent of that
growth occurs in Maine, then we estimate that Maine
GDP would increase $138 million in 2032.
This approach assumes that the relationship between
the Maine and US economies remains constant through
2032. In reality, differing levels of public and private
investment and demographic change may cause some
states to grow faster than others. Population projections
suggest that Maine’s economy may account for a smaller
portion of the nation’s future economic growth than it
does today. However, quantifying the likely effects of
those changes would require substantial analysis with
additional assumptions, little data, and considerable
imprecision. Furthermore, it would probably affect the
results only minimally. Thus, we use a simple extrapolation with maximum transparency and minimum
assumptions. Assuming Maine’s economy constitutes an
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equal or smaller percentage of the US economy in 2032
than it does today, the following estimates can be viewed
as upper-bounds of the TPP’s potential impact.
Where the USITC estimates the TPP’s potential
impact on the level of overall US employment, it is
possible to extrapolate the potential impact on Maine
employment by calculating a ratio as described above.
Where the USITC presents the TPP’s impact as a
percentage change in US employment, as it does for
sectors and industries, no further extrapolations are
necessary. Since this methodology assumes that the
TPP’s Maine impacts are proportional to its US impacts,
the USITC’s percentage estimates for changes to
employment are the de facto projections of Maine.
Where that occurs, we present the Maine–US employment ratio for context only.
Economy-wide Effects
The USITC estimates that the TPP would have
slight, positive effects on overall measures of US
economic growth. In 2032, it would increase real
income, real GDP, and employment by 0.23 percent,
0.15 percent, and 0.07 percent, respectively. These
changes would come from higher earnings due to
increased exports and reduced costs due to cheaper
imports. Savings from reduced costs would give
consumers and businesses additional money to spend or
invest elsewhere in the economy.
Maine’s share of these gains also would be small: in
2032 there would be about 554 additional FTE jobs,
real GDP would increase by approximately $106 per
capita, and real income would increase by approximately
$163 per capita. That means the TPP’s value to Maine
residents in 2032 would be equivalent to about $163 per
person (Table 5).
Trade Effects
Trade among TPP countries would increase if the
agreement went into effect, with the largest increases
occurring where current trade barriers are highest. The
USITC estimates that overall US exports to TPP countries would increase $57.2 billion in 2032. The highest
percentage increases would be with countries without an
existing US FTA (Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand,
and Vietnam). Some of those sales would be diverted
from non-TPP countries, so the overall impact would
be a $27.2 billion increase in US exports. Imports
would rise by approximately $48.9 billion (Table 6).
Therefore, the overall result would be a deepening of the
US trade deficit by about $21.7 billion.
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Maine has a slightly higher percentage of exports to
TPP countries than the rest of the country due to
concentrations of sales to Malaysia (semiconductors)
and Canada (lobster, wood, and paper). Malaysia is in
the new-FTA-partners category and Canada is an
existing FTA partner. Total Maine exports to TPP countries would increase by about $143 million. Accounting
for sales diverted from non-TPP countries, total Maine
exports would increase by about $47 million. There are
no data on state imports due to the difficulty of tracking

goods once they enter the country. Therefore, it is not
possible to generate an estimate of the TPP’s impact on
Maine imports.

Sector Effects
The TPP would generate overall economic gains,
but its effect on various sectors and industries would
differ. The USITC estimates impacts in three broad
sectors (agriculture and food; manufacturing, natural
resources, and energy; and services) and 56 industries.
In some cases, the USITC categories do not align with industry
Table 5:
Estimated Economy-wide Effects of TPP on the United
data
available at the state level. In
States and Maine: Changes Relative to Baseline in 2032
other cases, there is no Maine
production in small industrial
United States (USITC)
Maine
categories or there is insufficient
Percentage
data to generate meaningful estiof Maine’s
mates.
This was especially true in
share of US
agriculture.
Furthermore, there
Level
economic
Level
Per
Effect
(billion) Percentage
activity
(million) capita
are no statistics on state imports
or state service exports. In
Real income
$57.3
0.23
0.37
$212
$163
general, there is better state-level
Real GDP
$42.7
0.15
0.32
$138
$106
information on employment and
Employment
128,200
0.07
0.43
554
—
exports, which must be reported,
(full-time equivalents)
than on output, which is often
proprietary. The following
sections discuss the calculations
Table 6:
Estimated Trade Effects of TPP on the United States and
that were possible given those
Maine: Changes Relative to Baseline in 2032
limitations.
United States (USITC)

Agriculture and Food

Maine

Level
(billion)

Percentage

Percentage
of Maine’s
share of US
economic
activity

Exports to
TPP partners

$57.2

5.6

0.25

$143

$110

New FTA partners

$34.6

18.7

0.29

$100

$77

Existing FTA partners

$22.6

2.7

0.24

$55

$43

Total worldwide
exports

$27.2

1.0

0.17

$47

$36

Imports from
TPP partners

$47.5

3.5

—

—

—

New FTA partners

$23.4

10.4

—

—

—

Existing FTA partners

$24.2

2.1

—

—

—

Total worldwide
imports

$48.9

1.1

—

—

—
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Level
(million)

Per
capita

Agriculture and food is by
far the smallest of the USITC
sectors in both Maine and the
nation. However, it would have
the largest percentage gains
because many countries have
high tariffs in this sector. US
agriculture and food exports and
imports would both increase, but
exports would rise more. The net
gain would be $4.5 billion in
2032 (Table 7). There is no
corresponding import data for
Maine, but it is reasonable to
assume that Maine consumers
have spending habits similar to
their US peers, so Maine also
would likely experience a net
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gain in this sector. The size of the gain would depend on
the ability of Maine farmers and food processors to
leverage the new market opportunities created by tariff
reductions in other countries.
The USITC estimates that the TPP would slightly
increase output in all US agriculture and food industries
except rice, soybeans, and seafood. However, it is difficult to extrapolate from those results for Maine because
of the small size of the state’s agricultural industries. In
many cases, there is no or little Maine production or
data are not disclosable due to privacy protections. Two
industries for which it is possible to extrapolate results
are seafood and dairy.
In seafood, US output would likely decline by
about 0.2 percent in 2032. Exports would increase
about 2.2 percent, with exports to Japan and Vietnam
increasing 18 percent and 45 percent, respectively.
Seafood imports would increase about 0.9 percent and
would exceed the value of exports by more than three to
one ($231.9 billion compared to $74.1 billion). Most of
the import growth would be from TPP members
without an existing FTA.
How these changes would affect Maine fisheries
would depend on the degree to which domestic
consumers find seafood imported from TPP countries
to be a substitute for Maine fish and shellfish and on the
ability of Maine businesses to exploit new market
opportunities. US tariffs on most seafood are already
low, and Maine consumers can already access a wide
variety of foreign seafood.
The proven ability of Maine’s lobster industry to
access foreign markets suggests that it would gain under
the TPP. Current tariffs on Maine lobsters are as high as
34 percent in Vietnam, 8 percent in Malaysia, and 5

percent in Japan and New Zealand, depending on how
it is processed and shipped. Increased exports to South
Korea following the implementation of a trade agreement with that country have led some people within
Maine’s seafood industry to be optimistic that the TPP
would further increase demand from Asia.7
The USITC expects that the TPP would increase US
dairy output by 1.3 percent in 2032. An increase in US
dairy exports translates to an increased in Maine dairy
exports of about $2.7 million in 2032, based on Maine’s
small percentage of US dairy exports (0.15 percent).
Maine has a slightly larger percentage of US processed
food exports (0.35 percent). Growth in that sector would
translate to about $5.4 million in additional exports in
2032 and output growth of 0.8 percent.
Two crops of particular interest, potatoes and blueberries, are included in the large USITC categories of
“processed foods” and “fresh fruit, vegetables, and nuts.”
Without further detail, it is impossible to calculate
appropriate ratios and extrapolate state impacts from the
national estimates. However, it is noteworthy that Japan,
Malaysia, and Vietnam would eliminate their tariffs on
fresh, frozen, and prepared potatoes, which range from
about 8.5 percent in Japan to as much as 34 percent in
Vietnam (USDA 2016). Those countries would also
eliminate tariffs on categories that include blueberries,
which range from as high as 17 percent in Japan to 30
percent in Malaysia and Vietnam (USDA 2016).

Services
International trade barriers in services are already
relatively low, so percentage changes in this sector are
generally smaller than in agriculture and food. However,
because it is such a large sector, the absolute gains are
large. According to the USITC,
the
increased demand for services
Table 7:
Agriculture and Food Sector: Estimated Effects of TPP
would
exceed the US supply,
Relative to Baseline in 2032
thereby increasing demand for
imported services (Table 8). This
United States (USITC)
Maine
would presumably occur as
Percentage
cheaper imports gave US
of Maine’s
consumers and businesses more
share of US
Level
economic
Level
Per
money to spend on services.
(billion) Percentage
activity
(million) capita
The USITC estimates that
Output
$10.0
0.5
0.36
$36
$28
the TPP would slightly increase
output and employment in all
Exports
$7.2
2.6
0.38
$27
$21
service sectors except transportaImports
$2.7
1.5
—
—
—
tion, logistics, travel, and tourism
Employment
—
0.5
0.40
—
—
(those industries are combined
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into one subsector). They suggest two reasons for
reduced growth in that subsector. First, trade barriers in
these areas are already low and the TPP would not liberalize them significantly. The model assumes that
economic resources would shift to areas where trade
liberalization creates new opportunities and away from
less dynamic sectors. Second, this subsector includes
international tourism. If income gains allow more US
residents to travel abroad, that would appear in the
model as higher tourism imports. However, a loss for
the United States may be a gain for Maine. Greater
travel by US residents would likely benefit all tourism
destinations, both domestic and foreign.

amount ($39.2 billion), resulting in an overall drop in
output (Table 9). These results reflect a continuation of
recent trends. In Maine, these results suggest that
export-oriented manufacturers would fare better than
those who are not export oriented.
The USITC’s estimates suggest that the TPP would
have a neutral or slightly positive impact on output for
11 of 25 industries in energy, natural resources, and
manufacturing (including apparel, footwear, and
passenger vehicles). It would reduce output growth in
the remaining 14 industries (including textiles, leather,
forestry, and electrical equipment). The USITC notes
that all industries within this sector are expected to grow
in 2032 in absolute terms. Therefore, the negative
Manufacturing, Natural Resources, and Energy
results are reductions in growth, not absolute declines.
According to the USITC estimates, the US manuThe USITC predicts slight increases in output of
facturing, natural resources, and energy sector would fare
US apparel and footwear. Indeed, the American Apparel
the worst from increased competition from foreign
and Footwear Association and the Footwear Distributors
imports. Exports would increase by about $15.2 billion,
and Retailers of America have endorsed the TPP. Many
but imports would grow by nearly three times that
US companies in this industry have factories in Vietnam
and Malaysia, so tariff reductions
Table 8:
Services: Estimated Effects of TPP Relative to Baseline
would lower their costs.
in 2032
New Balance, an athletic-shoe
maker with approximately 900
employees at operations in
United States (USITC)
Maine
Norridgewock,
Skowhegan, and
Percentage
Norway,
Maine,
is unique in
of Maine’s
share of US
opposing the TPP (http://
Level
economic
Level
Per
newbalance.newsmarket.com/).
(billion) Percentage
activity
(million) capita
Although it imports some shoes
Output
$42.3
0.1
0.34
$144
$111
and shoe components, a large part
Exports
$4.8
0.6
0.34
$16
$13
of its business is US-made shoes
that currently benefit from a tariff
Imports
$7.0
1.2
—
—
—
on lower-cost imported shoes. The
Employment
—
0.1
0.43
—
—
TPP would lower and eventually
eliminate that tariff. That would
Table 9:
Manufacturing, Natural Resources, and Energy:
lower prices for US athletic-shoe
Estimated Effects of TPP Relative to Baseline in 2032
buyers, but potentially make New
Balance’s domestic operations
United States (USITC)
Maine
unviable. According Jon Chesto
Percentage
(Boston Globe, June 25, 2016),
of Maine’s
separate bills approved by both the
share of US
US
House of Representatives and
Level
economic
Level
Per
(billion) Percentage
activity
(million) capita
US Senate would require the
Department of Defense to
Output
$-10.8
-0.1
0.22
$-24
$-18
purchase only US-made athletic
Exports
$15.2
0.9
0.15
$23
$18
shoes for military recruits. Since
Imports
$39.2
1.1
—
—
—
New Balance and Wolverine
Employment
—
-0.2
0.44
—
—
Worldwide, a Michigan shoemaker,
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are the only companies that could currently satisfy that
order, passage of the bill could offset some of the potential negative impact of the tariff reduction. However, as
of this publication, the bills are not yet law.
The USITC estimates a 2.1 percent increase in
wood product imports primarily from TPP members
without an existing FTA. There would be a smaller
increase in US exports, but the overall result would be a
0.5 percent output reduction in 2032. In Maine, that
corresponds to a decrease in wood products of about
$18 million in 2032.
CONCLUSION

T

he TPP would likely have a neutral or slightly
positive impact on overall measures of Maine’s
economy in the long run. The benefits would be relatively small and spread across the population. The real
income gains for Maine residents, in terms of increased
earnings and greater purchasing power from lower-cost
products, would equal about $163 per person in 2032.
Underlying those overall gains, some sectors would
experience a slight reduction in growth in terms of jobs,
output, and exports.
The TPP’s estimated economic impact is smaller
than the public fervor about it would suggest. There are
at least three reasons for that. First, the estimated impact
of any FTA often appears small relative to the large,
observable impacts of globalization. Second, the United
States has already liberalized trade with six of eleven TPP
countries, so the agreement’s marginal impact is smaller
than it would appear at first. Third, Maine’s economy
has experienced irreversible structural changes in the last
few decades and will now react to changes in trade
differently than in the past. ENDNOTES

1
2

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press
-Release/2015pr/12/ft920/index.html
Data in this paragraph come from the following
sources: Income statistics: US Census Bureau, Current
Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic
Supplements. Table H-8. Median Household Income
by State: 1984 to 2014. GDP: US Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product in Chained
Dollars. Exports: US Census Bureau, Economic
Indicators Division, USA Trade Online: State commodity
exports by Harmonized System Code (HS). https://
usatrade.census.gov/
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3

Data from US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Mass Layoff
Statistics, Series ID: MLUMS23NN0001005. https://www
.bls.gov/mls/ and US Department of Labor, Employment
and Training Administration, Trade Adjustment
Assistance for Workers Program Petition Data. https://
www.doleta.gov/tradeact/taa_reports/petitions.cfm

4

Data in this section are from the US Census Bureau,
Country and Product Trade Data, Exports, Imports and
Trade Balance by Country, Monthly Totals, 1985–Present.
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country
/index.html

5 If the TPP became law, NAFTA and other FTAs would
remain in effect. Where TPP and other FTAs differ
(in terms of tariff rates or rules of origin) firms could
choose which agreement to use.
6

(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)

7

According to an article in the Bangor Daily News
(November 25, 2016), Emily Lane of Calendar Island
Lobster Co. in Portland said, “We’ve already seen this
with the free trade agreement with South Korea. That
caused a significant increase in lobster consumption
over the last couple years.”
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